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We propose to show that, although we think of Descartes as a "modern Parmenides" or 
as the "father of Modernity", otherwise for excellent reasons, this condition is at least as 
ambiguous as different are the cultures or societies that arose from the breakdown of 
Christianity. Where the Protestant Reformation triumphed, the dominant conception of 
philosophy is manifestly anticartesian (Wittgenstein and Heidegger), although they 
recognize, curiously, a debt to Cartesian philosophy. Neither empiricist nor rationalist, 
neither analytical nor continental, nor national or identitarian either, more than a 
"French", "European" or "Western" philosopher, Descartes would be a philosopher of 
ours, that is, a philosopher of the universalist Counter-Reformation or Catholic 
Reformation.  Also, even if we stick to what the professional and hegemonic practice of 
"philosophy" means today, Descartes would be known as a pre- or paramodern 
philosopher, that is, an filósofo del arrabal, an outskirt philosopher. 
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I believe that one of the best ways to take advantage of an encounter like the one 
we have right now is to put forward, above all, our most evident or most significant 
differences, and prejudices, before our coincidences as academics and researchers. We 
are living in an increasingly Mcluhian era in which, until yesterday, what remained distant 
suddenly comes into contact, at least, in electronic contact right now, because of the 
unfortunate coronavirus pandemic. For that contact to be proper, or genuinely fruitful, at 
the level of ideas, it seems necessary to put forward those distances that may persist as a 
testimony that the world continues to be, for its part, genuinely tremendous and diverse, 
despite the banal metaphor of the “new normalities” for which they now want to 
understand the whole world.  
Thanks to this circumstance, I can propose to you some specific observations that 
I have been making in my last publications1 on Descartes, which, from the north, reaches 
our bookstore’s en masse; and what a better way than to do it in English-speaking Canada. 
At the time, I had a very brief exchange with Richard Watson himself, from whose 
2002 Cogito ergo sum: The Life of René Descartes, begun my general confirmation that, 
in the cultured or semi-cultured Western imaginary, in our day, Descartes is 
misrepresented (in the Protestant north and the corresponding secularist south, let us 
say) nothing less than with Voltaire. Also, I have the suspicion that this confusion comes 
from an identity campaign organized within the Western imaginary that I have just 
pointed out. Nothing is surprising in this, François Azouvi warns in his Descartes et la 
France, also from 2002, by the way, as a result of the very successful operation that, of 
the figure of the so-called father of Modernity, carried out the great captain of the 
illustrated. 
 
1 Mainly in Vindicación del cartesianismo radical (Anthropos, Barcelona, 2010) and La religión de 
Descartes (Anthropos, Barcelona, 2015). 
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However, Richard Watson presents himself as an expert on Descartes, and Russel 
Shorto reaffirms it, in 2009, in his also highly promoted book Descartes’ Bones where 
Shorto writes that “Richard Watson is perhaps America’s leading Descartes specialist.”2  
Well, for Richard Watson now (or until recently, since writing this article I discover 
on the Internet that he died in September 2019), as for Richard Popkin from The History 
of Scepticism, from 1979 (he died, for his part, in 2005), Descartes is for now, or was, 
nothing less than a sceptical and fideistic thinker. 
The amusing thing about this is that Descartes himself did not in fact take 
the problem of certainty seriously. He never thought we could have certain 
knowledge of the world about us, neither did he worry about it. As for God 
deceiving us, he said that the demon hypothesis is metaphysical and 
hyperbolical, which means just what you think. It would be very rash to 
doubt God´s existence, and it would be really dumb to worry about not 
having certain truth when you have to make a living. For God’s existence, 
we have faith. For practical affairs, we have always gotten along with 
probable knowledge and always will.3 
As if to wonder what Richard Watson has read, or from what prejudices or 
preconceptions, or from what spiritual background he has read it since his Descartes is 
certainly not that of the Discourse on Method, Metaphysical Meditations, and Principles 
of Philosophy but indeed, that of Voltaire’s Philosophical Letters. 
Against such a deformation (or, if you want, against such a “refraction”), which, in 
the realm of philosophy itself, or in that of severe and rigorous Cartesian studies, hardly 
needs to be refuted, I believe that for now, it will enough  just remembering, from the 
 
2 Cfr. Russel Shorto, Descartes Bones: A skeletal History of the conflict between faith and reason, Double 
Day, USA. P. 237.  
3 Cfr. Richard Watson, Cogito, ergo sum. The Life of René Descartes, second edition (first in 2002), David R. 
Godine Publisher, Boston 2007, pp.9-10. 
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first part of the Discourse on the Method, that obvious autobiographical and vocational 
phrase that defines the Cartesian project like few others: 
And I constantly felt —we read in (AT VI 9)— a burning desire 
to learn to distinguish the true from the false, to see my 
actions for what they were, and to proceed with confidence 
through life. 
 
Completing it of course with that famous passage in Part Six of the Discourse on the 
Method itself, in which he alerts precisely that, thanks to the fact that his Method, and the 
physics-mathematics derived from it, allows him to do what Watson says that he never can 
worried: 
knowing the power and action of fire, water, air, stars, the 
heavens, and all the other bodies that are around us as 
distinctly as we know the different trades of our craftsmen, 
we could put them to all the uses for which they are suited 
and thus make ourselves as it were the masters and 
possessors of nature. (AT, VI, 62). 
 
Moreover, this is something that later texts will only confirm, although with anti-
rationalist, anti-idealist, or anti-positivist nuances as well, which expresses that highly 
understandable “how”.  For example, the letter to Picot in which philosophy is described, 
mainly,  as the study at the same time of moral wisdom and technology with the explicit 
requirement that both be rooted in the specific knowledge of things; precisely,  that which 
is possible thanks to the principles of philosophy (id est: the existence of a good and faithful 
creator God, of the ego cogito or res cogitans, and the intelligible material world or res 
extensa). 
Returning to Watson, and to Voltaire, a couple of paragraphs not from the letter 
that the latter dedicates to Descartes and Newton, but from the one he wrote to expose 
the doctrine of his hero John Locke, give us a clear antecedent, also very flagrantly anti-
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Cartesian, from the curious and significant text by Richard Watson that we have just 
quoted. 
 Locke doubts, as the authors of the Sixth Objections do, that the attribute of 
thought can be denied to a purely material being (id est, to res extensa) and that to the 
highly cultured, or the highly skilled Voltaire it certainly seems that it is exceptionally 
meritorious and even wise.  
 
Some Englishmen, devout in their way, sounded the alarm. 
[…] They affirmed that Locke wanted to overthrow religion, 
and yet it was not religion that was involved in this matter; it 
was a purely philosophical question, very independent of 
faith and revelation; It was only necessary to examine without 
acrimony if there is a contradiction when saying: “matter can 
think”, and if God can communicate thought to matter.4 
 
In addition to ignoring, displaying its proverbial lightness, the distinction between 
the res cogitans and the res extensa that, as we know (and as Elisabeth, Spinoza, Leibniz 
and very long etcetera knew), are central in Cartesian thought - or in addition to 
confusing, and obscuring, Gorgias revived, the clear and different principles of 
philosophy—, Voltaire takes us back here, in the middle of the Age of Enlightenment, to 
a frankly too little luminous Averroism.  
 
For the rest - Voltaire insists a little later, in that same text 
dedicated to Locke - one must never fear that any 
philosophical sentiment can harm the religion of a country. 
Although our mysteries are contrary to our demonstrations, 
they are still revered by Christian philosophers who know 
 
4 Cfr. Voltaire, Mélanges, Gallimard, París, 1961, p. 39. 
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that the objects of reason and those of faith are of different 
natures.5 
 
We face, here, an Averroism or theory of the double truth; we are at the faces of 
fideism, in the first or most superficial level of reading at least. Furthermore, that is the 
lens with which, for example, Richard Watson will come, scrutinize, and exalted at the 
dawn of our century the figure of Descartes (to whom, according to Watson, the modern 
world owes from individualism and democracy to genetic engineering, through personal 
computers, neurophysiology, and the atomic bomb as well). 
And although the text of Richard Watson that we have just cited comes from the 
introduction to a book of excellent circulation, or dissemination or propaganda, 
everything indicates that his statements are not a matter of mere negligence, or 
incompetence or lack of depth - or mere adaptation to the taste of consumers - since, for 
now, they advertise very well what is going to be read throughout the whole book,  in 
which we note the effort that Watson makes to assimilate Descartes to his own 
philosophical position of late Illuminist orientation and even to his own religious, personal 
or cultural stance; meanwhile, for him, Descartes could not be anything other than a 
barely masked Protestant. 
Throughout its more than three hundred pages, Watson interprets in favour of 
that last thesis, or that recovery, how far or near it lends itself, or seems to lend itself to 
it. Even that clear and precise declaration of his Catholicism that Descartes made to Revius 
when he exhorted him, in the rebellious United Provinces, to convert to Protestantism. 
I also remarked above that in 1641 in Holland when being 
hassled to convert to Protestantism by Jacob Revius, Descartes 
replied that he was of the religion of his king and his nurse. His king, 
the king of his youth, was Henri IV, formerly the Protestant king od 
Navarre, who contributed the property for the Royal College at La 
Flèche where Descartes went to school. Descartes saw the 
deposition of the actual heart of Henri IV in the chapel in La Flèche 
 
5 Cfr. op. cit., p. 42. 
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in 1610. When Henri de Navarre converted in 1595 to become Henri 
IV, the totally in-character story was spread that he quipped that 
Paris was worth a Mass. He was also the master politician who 
promised his people a chicken in every pot. So Descartes’s king was 
an opportunistically converted Protestant. In 1610, Henri IV wore a 
green silk suit and was known as the Green Gallant. When Descartes 
left for Sweden in 1649, he wore a green silk suit in the highest 
fashion of Henri IV’s days.  
As for Descartes nurse, in either La Haye or Châtellerault, it 
was perfectly possible in 1596 that he could have been a Protestant. 
Given that Descartes was born an spent his childhood in free 
Protestant towns and then spent the major part of his life in 
Protestant armies, Protestant lands, and Protestant courts, one has 
to consider the question of whether or not he was a Protestant, in 
sympathy if not in fact. It is neat joke about his king and his nurse. I 
cannot imagine that Descartes was not aware of it.6 
Although frankly inadmissible for those familiar with the life and work of Descartes, all 
these conjectures have the double interest of, on the one hand, convincing, as I have already been 
able to verify, and commenting myself, even academics –– or Epistemons - more unwary, and to 
convince, on the other hand, the author himself of those assumptions and by extension, perhaps, 
also convince his own or immediate cultural environment. And this is significant, for now, of how, 
here and there, both the corpus itself, or tradition, as well as the current exercise of “philosophy”, 
and of ours, for the same reason (for that spiritual background that encourages or discourages 
them), divergent or different philosophies. 
Watson’s book created a kind of school, or the situation, or the urgency that provoked or 
inspired it, and in 2005 the controversial University of London professor Anthony Clifford Grayling 
- an active militant, by the way, of contemporary atheism - published the exciting and significant 
book: Descartes. The Life of René Descartes and its Place in his Time. In it, prolonging Watson’s 
 
6 Cfr. Richard Watson, op. cit., p. 59. 
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“refreshing mischief”,7 as one who nevertheless corrects this excess of assuming that Descartes 
was a masked Protestant, Grayling now suggests that the great philosopher of Touraine was 
instead, in the Netherlands above all, a spy at the service of the Jesuits, and of the Austrian and 
Spanish Habsburgs (that is, of the defenders, precisely, of Christianity or the pre-Westphalian 
theological-political order). 
The exciting thing, for our purposes now is that, despite that elementary correction that 
Grayling makes to Watson regarding some established and verifiable biographical data (not his 
fantastic spy status, but his catholicity), deep down Grayling shares, in his reading of Descartes, 
the same fundamental error of perspective, so to speak, that we find in the work of Richard 
Watson. 
Attentive above all to the issue of desacralization (or the de-divinization that Heidegger 
would say, and for which in his opinion the transcendent God of Genesis would not be the 
immense progress that he was, and that is, but an obstacle), Grayling compares Descartes not 
with Parmenides, but with Thales of Miletus: 
What Thales attributed to man in antiquity, says Grayling, 
Descartes attributed to the early modern age. That is why he is 
sometimes rightly called the "father of modern philosophy" for 
comparison. He played a central role in rescuing research on sublunary 
things from the stifling and rigid rule of religious authority. He did not 
do so, he emphasizes, by rejecting that authority, for by his testimony 
he was a devout Catholic throughout his life, but by separating things 
in heaven from things on earth, so that scientific reason could 
investigate the latter without anguish over orthodoxy. The things of 
heaven were left intact, without being threatened - as Descartes 
thought and hoped - by what scientific investigation discovered.8 
I am afraid not, that Descartes never separated things in heaven from things on earth, at least 
physically speaking. Moreover, as for the theological or metaphysical level, as I have just said, the 
separation that de-divinizes nature and makes it the object of human investigation, that in reality is 
 
7 Cfr. Anthony Clifford Grayling, Descartes. La vida de René Descartes y su lugar en su época, Pre-Textos, 
Valencia, 2007, p. 25, n. 1. 
8 Cfr. Grayling, op. cit., p. 20. 
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rooted in the creator and transcendent God of Genesis, whose role is central in Cartesian thought. 
Four years later Russel Shorto, a columnist for the New York Times who is also dedicated to 
philosophy, reaffirms and publishes — taking up, without saying it, by the way, the subject of an 
excellent book by Philippe Comar— another biography of Descartes, or his "relics" instead, in which 
he acts as the champion of a faltering enlightened, liberal, and undoubtedly post-Christian western 
civilization (or "modern", or "post" or "hypermodern")9 
He too corrects Watson's first excess, and in him also emerges, for now, that strange, and 
consensual or cultural dualism that we have just found in Grayling. From the perspective, then, of 
Russel Shorto: 
Descartes himself was so devoted in his faith, and at the same 
time so convinced of the legitimacy of the investigation of the natural 
world, based on reason, that the division of reality into two distinctly 
different halves seemed to him the only logical conclusion.10 
Again, we wonder which Descartes did they read, or from where or with what lenses they did so. I 
argue that after such a strange assessment - quite marked, that of Grayling, by the anti-Catholic black 
legend, despite its recognition of the genuine catholicity of Descartes - there are above all, on the 
one hand, that Lutheran dualism, which I have already dealt with in other works11, and on the other 
(or by the same, only that at another level) Lockean or liberal dualism, which in reality have nothing 
of Cartesian. Descartes, in fact, very carefully separates philosophy from theology, but by no means 
does he do the same with its "objects." Revelation illuminates us through grace, on the same creation 
that, for his part, the philosopher studies applying the Method and understanding aided by the rest 
of the faculties, as nature.  
It would be enough to stop, for example, in the physics of transubstantiation to show that 
the separation that Grayling and Shorto speak of has certainly not taken place. 
When Jean Frère asked me, in my early years as a student at the Strasbourg University of 
Human Sciences, why I was doing my thesis on Descartes and not on Plato, I replied that albeit to 
 
9 Cfr. Juan Carlos Moreno Romo (Coord.), Modernidad, postmodernidad, hipermodernidad…, Fontamara, 
México, 2020. 
10 Cfr. op. cit., p. 82. 
11 Cfr. Juan Carlos Moreno Romo, “¿Y si el filósofo enmascarado fuese en realidad Lutero”, Filosofia e 
teologia I / 2017, pp. 65 – 73. 
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understand Plato, I had to provide myself with a whole cultural, and religious context, to which I did 
not have access (I do not know what Plato means when he speaks of the gods, and I do not know if 
there is anyone who understands it), the world of Descartes was, instead, with minimal differences, 
mine. 
Reading works such as the ones I have just reviewed confirms that same opinion on a side 
that I did not see much of at the time. We are better armed, in the catholic and baroque south, to 
understand Descartes insofar as, deep down, he is one of us. With the rest of the great modern 
thinkers, things change almost entirely. 
An interesting detail in this regard: Russel Shorto, makes a significant effort to understand 
our Catholic culture and the role that the body, the relics - those of the saints, and those of Descartes 
himself - have primarily, and above all, the Eucharist. "The body," -  notes Russel Shorto, -  "remains 
the touchstone of Modernity."12 Furthermore, he is right, and here we could linger on Heine, on 
Nietzsche, and on what Ortega ends up understanding about the body and Catholicity, precisely 
around his reading of the great German thinkers. "The Protestant Reformation was," - Russel Shorto 
continues, - "an attack on transubstantiation, and on the earthly power it conferred on the Catholic 
Church."13  Further, a little later he makes a quite Nietzschean or highly "Platonic" observation which, 
in these days of "confinement" and the total or partial closure of churches, resonates with a special 
meaning: 
Allegedly, - he notices it - the soul of Christ was not substantial 
enough to support the edifice of the Church in the world. The Catholic 
authorities also needed the body.14 
If Grayling compares Descartes with Thales of Miletus, and we with Parmenides, well, Russel 
Shorto goes much further because, for him, what Jesus Christ is for the Middle Ages, or Christianity 
in general, Descartes is for the Modernity. In addition to exaggerating excessively, I think that he is 
awarding Descartes the merit, or the demerit of a quasi-contemporary of his, in a moment we will 
see, who is the one who, in replacement of the body of Christ, proposes nothing more and nothing 
less than the body of the Leviathan. A couple of lines, before moving on to that topic a little more 
specifically, about another of those books wrote in the wake of Watson's: The Enigma of the Death 
 
12 Cfr. Russel Shorto, op. cit., p. 25. 
13 Cfr. op. cit., p. 81. 
14 Cfr. op. cit., p. 83. 
11 
 
of Descartes, also from 2009, by Westphalian Theodor Ebert, in which is also sustained by the very 
significant enormity that Descartes, in the court of Cristina of Sweden, and more precisely in the 
house of Ambassador Pierre Chanut, was poisoned by no less than a Jesuit, Father Viogué —using 
the hypothesis itself is already a sacrilege, and the sign of a very gross misunderstanding—, whit the 
Eucharist, supposedly because it was hindering them - although she has declared just the opposite - 
the conversion of the queen.15 
 The Pandora's box that Luther opened, if we take up the old Richard Popkin metaphor —or 
rather the wound, inflicted since then on Christianity—, is still open. Furthermore, this, which affects 
our Christianity, of course also affects, I insist, our philosophies. In contemporary France which, as 
we recognize is known and redefined as "Cartesian", a philosopher as representative of her as Pierre 
Manent, - and the political thought that dominates everything in the West- in his Histoire 
intellectuelle du libéralisme 1987, affirms the essential opposition that exists among the West as a 
successor or substitute for Christianity, and the search for, or compromise with, truth. That liberal 
scepticism, which in the wake of Locke and Voltaire Watson goes and attributes it to none other than 
Descartes (and with him also, for example, those Colombian colleagues with whom I discuss in the 
first part of La religion de Descartes), and how well things are seen - the fundamental liberal 
scepticism - frankly anti-philosophical, in general, and even quite specifically anti-Cartesian, it is 
above all and above all anti-Christian, or anti-Catholic. 
It is on the problem posed, or the challenge presented by a 
particular opinion, Christianity - writes Pierre Manent - that the liberal 
disjunction between power in general and opinion, in general, was 
operated.16 
Nevertheless, is Christianity a "private opinion"?  or the efforts all philosophical, reduced 
since then to the condition of mere doxa. That is what liberalism tries to do with it, disarm it, and 
in that same operation of transmutation of Truth into mere opinion, destroy all truths, wipe out 
all episteme properly so-called, or to all philosophical endeavours, reduced since then to the 
condition of mere doxa. Doxa tolerated, and even encouraged, and even of a certain prestige, 
especially if it is post-metaphysical and rejects, in one way or another, the archaic concept of Truth 
 
15 Cfr. Theodor Ebert, L’énigme de la mort de Descartes, traduit de l’allemand par Claire Husseman, 
Hermann, París, 2011, p. 143. 
16 Cfr. Pierre Manent, Histoire intellectuelle du libéralisme, Calman-Levy, Paris, 1987, p. 14. 
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(or if at least a new one is invented, like the clercs those denounced by Julien Benda, or as Alain 
Badiou is doing right now), but doxa after all, or ideology. The more sects there are, Voltaire will 
advise in Chapter V of his emblematic Treatise on Tolerance, the less power each of them will 
have. The more opinions, the less Truth: Plus il y a de sectes, moins chacune est dangereuse; la 
multiplicité les affaiblit (the more sects there are, the less dangerous each one; multiplicity 
weakens them).17 
Which again is in apparent contradiction with the philosophical project in general - with 
Platonic Socrates and his fight against the Sophists, for example - and with the Cartesian 
enterprise very especially; and what can already be seen is not, of course, due to a conceptual 
neither straightforward nor editorial nimbleness, such as one would be tempted to attribute to 
the prevalent, entertaining and even exciting book by Richard Watson. It is necessary to ask what 
has happened, also in the strict field of philosophy, in the passage from Christianity to the 
theological-political order that succeeded it — the Westphalian International Order — precisely 
in the lifetime of Descartes. Furthermore, about this, the Spanish Jesuit Carlos Valverde gives us, 
in his book Génesis, etructura y crisis de la Modernidad, from 1996 (in which he is not too fair with 
the great disciple of his predecessors, or with his comrades in La Flèche ), a decisive clue. 
The Peace of Westphalia, ending the European religious-
political wars, was signed in Münster on October 24, 1648, two years 
before Descartes died. It meant the final collapse and the final failure 
of the attempt to regain European unity under the sign of the Catholic 
faith and the imperial sceptre. Spain, under the leadership, above all, 
of Emperor Charles and later of his son Felipe II, had made a matter of 
honour and conscience to achieve once again the religious and civil 
unity of the European continent lost since the Reformation. It was an 
impossible undertaking in which Spain exhausted its men and its 
treasury and only won the antipathies of all Europeans. Singular was 
the antipathy of French to Spanish and, in turn, of Spanish to French. 
In the Peace of Westphalia, the Spanish project definitively failed, and 
the French project triumphed. The idea of the Christian Empire is gone 
forever. It had to give way to the new plural, religious and political 
 
17Cfr. Voltaire, op. cit., p. 581. 
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situation, constituted by the balance of States and religions that, only 
in the second half of the 20th century, seems to have achieved a 
relative climate of peace and, it must be said, of philosophical, 
religious and moral scepticism. Europe was then divided into different 
states and religions, which led to the loss of prestige of all.18 
Moreover, this, that Professor Carlos Valverde (who died not long ago, in 2003) was able to 
see so clearly from Madrid, did not escape at all to Richard Watson from Saint Louis Missouri. For 
him what was at stake then was the opposition between the "Catholic absolutism" of Richelieu and 
Louis XIV - in which Descartes could have found, thanks to his well-situated family links, a constantly 
uncomfortable accommodation - and French republican Protestantism, exiled in the (on the other 
hand allies of that same French absolutism, regalist and post-Catholic rather) United Provinces. 
But Descartes ran out on it all. His was not a flight from family and 
social responsibility. His move to the United Provinces —forever— 
was a revolutionary political act. Ha abandoned France almost at the 
precise moment that France began to be the first modern state. 
Descartes could have been in on the beginning of the reign of the 
Sun King, Louis XIV. He could have been a highly positioned courtier. 
For whatever reason, he chose not to. I don’t know that Descartes 
himself saw it that way, and certainly most French Cartesian scholars 
do not, but it is plain as can be that Descartes’s move to the United 
Provinces at the end of 1628 was an act of solidarity with republican 
French Protestation against royalist Catholic totalitarian oppression, 
and of liberal Christianity against the Spanish Inquisition. He was not 
opposed to the Catholic religion: he was opposed to the Catholic 
state; he was afraid of the oppressive nature and acts of the 
Catholicism that was the state religion of France.19 
It is curious how, in Watson's opinion, freedom is on the side of those who so radically 
and so anti-Cartesianly deny it. Watson says that Descartes went to take refuge in Holland fleeing 
from Cardinal Pierre de Bérulle, in 1628, but the Truth is that he instead went to Sweden, in 1649, 
 
18 Cfr. Carlos Valverde, Génesis, estructura y crisis de la Modernidad, Cristiandad, Madrid, 1996, p. 133. 
19 Cfr. Richard Watson, op, cit., p. 153. 
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fleeing from Voetius and his coreligionists. The enjeux, which was theological-political, had, 
however, a much greater scope than Watson attributed to it (and I wonder if Descartes fell, at the 
time, fully aware of it). 
Henri Kissinger explains it very well in his recent book World order, from 2014. In those 
years, the very "international order" was being gestated in which, despite such tremendous and 
continuous turbulence pointed out by Carlos Valverde, we are right now, all, still. 
Religious unity had fractures – explains Henri Kissinger - with the 
survival and spread of Protestantism; political diversity was inherent 
in the number of autonomous political units that had fought to a draw. 
So it was that in Europe the conditions of the contemporary world 
were approximated: a multiplicity of political units, none powerful 
enough to defeat all others, many adhering to contradictory 
philosophies and internal practices, in search of neutral rules to 
regulate their conduct and mitigate conflict.  
The Westphalian peace reflected a practical accommodation to reality, 
not a unique moral insight. It relied on a system of independent states 
refraining from interference in each other´s domestic affairs and 
checking each other´s ambitions through a general equilibrium of 
power. No single claim to truth or universal rule had prevailed in 
Europe´s contests. Instead, each state was assigned the attribute of 
sovereign power over its territory.20  
 
In the new theological-political order power prevails over truth, and especially over 
“metaphysical” or “religious” truth, degraded to the rank of opinion. So, the state operates, more 
and more efficiently, by the way, as a true malin génie. 
While René Descartes, then, like a true modern Parmenides, renewed philosophy - in his Ulm 
barracks, next to the Danube, or in his Dutch retreat - from its deepest foundations, the powerful 
France of Richelieu and Mazarin, through their Allies, the Protestant powers, was gestating a world 
in which philosophy itself was going to be of more, like religion itself, or as all truth itself. 
 
20 Cfr. Henri Kissinger, World Order, Penguin Group, USA, 2014, pp. 8-9 
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From the Peace of Westphalia, what was truly important was to be the nation-state, that 
European invention that Pierre Manent also highlights in the wake of the absolute monarchy, as a 
political device that remains equidistant from the city and the empire. That, on the other hand, they 
are much more “natural”, and for whom what matters is above all, above all “opinion” or all, 
uncomfortable or demanding truth, his conatus, or his pure and naked “interest”. 
With the Treaty of Westphalia - we continue reading in the book 
above by Henri Kissinger - the papacy had been confined to 
ecclesiastical functions, and the doctrine of sovereign equality reigned. 
What political theory could explain the origin and justify the functions 
of secular political order? In his Leviathan, published in 1651, three 
years after the Peace of Westphalia, Thomas Hobbes provided such a 
theory. 21 
The modern world, then, much more than Cartesian (even if the trace of Descartes is in 
Hobbes himself), is Hobbesian. We notice this, for example, in Spinoza, whose rhetoric is Cartesian 
from top to bottom, but whose underlying ideas are more of Westphalian or Hobbesian roots. For 
example, that statement, in the last paragraph of the preface to the Theological-Political Treatise, in 
which he proclaims that 
I do not write anything that does not subject it very willingly to the 
examination and judgment of the supreme powers of my country. If 
they judge, in effect, that any of the things that I say, is opposed to 
the national laws or that it hinders the public salvation, I take it from 
now on for unspoken.22 
The imprimatur, from then on, the "truths" or "opinions" that can be published are a decision 
of the state and not of the Church, since the sovereign state, that "mortal god" that Hobbes says or 
that marvellous "way" of the Spinozist Substance, he has consecrated himself, and has taken over, 
among many other essential things, the truth, and science and philosophy. And, of beauty, let us not 
forget it, and that is expressed very well, for a century, by the so-called "contemporary art”!  
 
21 21 Cfr. Henri Kissinger, op. cit., p. 34 
22 Cfr. Spinoza, Tratado teológico-político, edited by Atilano Domínguez, Alianza, Madrid, 1986, p. 73. 
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Meanwhile Descartes, that thinker who, in his books, is concerned with being " useful to 
some people without being harmful to any" (AT, VI, 4), and receiving approval, mainly regarding his 
Meditations on First Philosophy in which the existence of God is demonstrated and the real distinction 
between the soul and the body of man, on the part of the deans and doctors of the sacred faculty of 
theology in Paris, Descartes is, as I already explained, evidently quite a pre-Westphalian philosopher. 
Let us look at it precisely to a paragraph of that introductory letter to which I just alluded: 
I have always considered that these two questions, of God 
and the soul, were the main ones that should instead be 
demonstrated for the reasons of philosophy than for those of 
theology: because even if it is enough for the faithful of the Church 
to believe by faith that there is a God and that the human soul does 
not die in any way with the body, It certainly does not seem that 
infidels can ever be persuaded of any religion, and not even of any 
moral virtue, if these two things are not first proved to them by 
natural reason. (AT, IX, 4). 
All this is undoubtedly very Catholic, and highly little Westphalian, and really little Protestant. 
I am hastily weaving my argument, and I have not yet remembered, let us do it right now, that for 
the theological anthropology that spreads throughout northern Europe since Luther - and that in the 
Holland of Descartes' first stay the Gomarists defend it to death, against the Arminians - the man 
who is incapable of virtue, is also incapable of truth, and therefore of philosophy. Although they have 
tried to make Descartes something like the Luther of philosophy, the real Descartes, the Descartes 
of his texts, his concepts and intuitions, and his arguments, or the Descartes of History that Henri 
Gouhier opposed, on the trail from Etienne Gilson, to the Descartes of the philosophy of History, the 
truth is that he does not fit very well in his role as Father of Modernity, or the modern or post-
Christian West. 
It is not for nothing, then, that, as the Mexican-Anglo-Canadian scholar Tom Sorell has 
pointed out, to the continental (Heidegger) and analytical (Wittgenstein) philosophies the caricature 
of Descartes is essential.23 These ideas are confirmed, in our case, in the Westphalian philosophy of 
 
23 Cfr. Tom Sorell, “Pertinence et limites de la caricature en histoire de la philosophie: le cas de Descartes”, 
en Yves Charles Zarka (Dir.), Comment écrire l’histoire de la philosophie ?, PUF, Paris, 2001, pp. 113-128. 
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our subcontinent, where Enrique Dussel falls back, for example, on his - quite Heideggerian- "Anti-
Cartesian Meditations"24 and on the prevalent sport of ridiculing Descartes. 
 I have already dealt with that text by Dussel, especially in September 2013, at the University 
of Burgundy, in my contribution to the Rencontres Franco-Sudaméricaines Autour de Descartes —or 
in my Filosofía del arrabal, too—, and for reasons of time, I'm not going to delay in it now. I will only 
point out that, despite their apparent program of "philosophical emancipation" and of the fight 
against "Eurocentrism", those philosophies of identity or presumably typical of "our region", deep 
down cannot be more Eurocentric than they are (all they derive, by the way, from the Ortega program 
of "Europeanization of Spain"25), and are, above all, frankly Westphalian. 
In his very recent book Philosophy in Mexico in the 20th century, from 2018, Gustavo Leyva, 
a colleague of Enrique Dussel, makes it crystal clear: after our "independences", the task of "our 
philosophies", or of the historian philosophies for him, in those more than a thousand pages in which 
our Catholic philosophers are conspicuous by their absence, was that of our "insertion into an 
international order that had the United States and Western Europe as its axes."26 
Kissinger also explains that very well: "independencies" always go through the formation, in 
the image and likeness of the European colonizers, of a "mortal god" of those who make up the new 
international order, or the Hobbesian jungle. That is why the search for an "own" Mexican or Latin 
American philosophy is flawed in origin. And that is why Descartes is so uncomfortable for our 
"typical" Westphalian or identity philosophy. Where we would have to claim it, it is rejected; and 
where he is claimed as the great hero of the Enlightenment or Modernity, he is falsified. And then it 
is more than evident that the enigma "Descartes" has too much to do with prejudices, or with the 
fundamental presuppositions of "our philosophies". 
I have no time left to develop it, but at least to point out — I have also already dealt with 
that, in Descartes alive, in "Moral and history in Descartes" - the unique attempt that the American 
Richard Kennington, a Disciple of Leo Strauss, he already did in a very suggestive text of 1963 to 
 
24 Cf. Enrique Dussel, « Meditaciones anti-cartesianas : sobre el origen del anti-discurso filosófico de la 
Modernidad », Tabula Rasa, Bogotá. Colombia, No. 9: 153-197, julio-diciembre 2008. 
25 An aspect that I deal with in my book Ortega y la filosofía del arrabal, Anthropos, Barcelona, 2020. 
26 Cfr. Gustavo Leyva, La filosofía en México en el siglo XX, Fondo de Cultura Económica, México, 2018, p. 
17. 
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transmute the pre-Westphalian or the Catholic René Descartes, no less than a Hobbesian philosopher 
and, therefore, thoroughly modern, or adept at the very modern world order. 
Kennington very cleverly twists Descartes' work too, to make his strange thesis plausible. A 
disciple of the author of Persecution and the art of writing, and in the wake of the famous cliché that 
of the "masked philosopher", he insinuates to reveal to his readers that, "in his private 
correspondence", Descartes "considered politics in Hobbes' De Cive as superior to his metaphysics 
(that of Hobbes) "and this of course in a positive sense, ignoring or hiding  to what extent Descartes' 
judgment of Hobbesian metaphysics is negative.27 
 
 
 
27 Cfr. Juan Carlos Moreno Romo (Coord.), Descartes vivo, Anthropos, Barcelona, 2007, p. 254, n. 11. 
